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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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REF : Thessaloniki A-36, October 31, 1963

Introduction and Summary

On November 3, a clear, balmy day, Northern Greek voters gave Constantinos CARAMANLIS sign that they were not entirely satisfied with his performance, for in the national elections held that day the voters here divided their vote almost evenly between the National Radical Union (ERE) and George PAPANDREOU's Center Union. This outcome was in sharp contrast to the 1961 vote when Thrace and Macedonia delivered a whopping 57.5 percent of its vote to Caramanlis and only 29 percent to the CU. Further, the crypto-Communist EDA improved its position slightly in Northern Greece while MARKEZENIS' Progressives performed almost as miserably here as they did in the rest of the country.

Specifically, ERE received 41 percent of the vote in last week's elections. It lost seats in all 16 electoral districts except Pieria, Drama and Halkidiki, and lost two apiece in Kozani and Xanthi. The Center Union increased its percentage of the vote from 29 to 39 percent. As a result, the number of CU seats will be doubled, rising from 17 to 34, while ERE seats will drop from 54 to 39. EDA's percent of the vote rose from 12.5 to 14.35 percent and its seats from 5 to 7. Finally, the Progressive Party ended up with only one deputy and 5 percent of the vote.

Caramanlis' disastrous experience at the polls appeared to be more the result of Papandreou's tremendous effort plus the erosion

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Clearances:

of his (Caramanlis') position through time and error rather than from economic or other causes. The current outlook is that the man of the hour, George Papandreou, will be given a fair chance by the Greek people to demonstrate whether he is capable of leading the nation along the path of spiritual as well as economic progress.

The Campaign and Elections

The general feeling here is that the electoral campaign was the most animated of any fought in a long while. The determination of Papandreou to unseat Caramanlis was reminiscent of TRUMAN's vigorous uphill campaign in 1948 against DEWEY, and the result surprised the experts just as much. In any event, his hard fought battle to unseat a Prime Minister who had been in office eight years gave the campaign its lively character. Papandreou pounded on themes which he had been developing since the elections two years ago; that an unrelenting struggle must be maintained against the "via ke nothia" of the 1961 elections, the totalitarian methods of the government, as evidenced by the LAMBRAKIS affair and the activities of TEA units, and against favoritism within the government as, for example, in appointments, contract awards and favors for wealthy party supporters. These arguments, real or imagined, appeared to have some effect on the electorate. Caramanlis, for his part, stressed the development already achieved under his party's leadership and the need for continued political stability in order to insure future growth and development.

Thus the themes of democracy and clean government versus continued political stability and economic progress became the major themes of the campaign. At least as important in Greek politics is the voter's reaction to the leading personalities in the electoral duel. In Northern Greece it became apparent during their tours that the crowds were affected more strongly and positively by Papandreou than by Caramanlis. This time the crowds seemed to be reacting to the man Papandreou and his words, while in the case of Caramanlis neither the man nor his talk of stability stirred the voters as they once had.

Some of the other important issues appeared to be the general neglect of education and the need for its reform. There was also much talk by Papandreou about tax reductions, increased wages and salaries for practically everybody, and the need to create more jobs in order to slow down the outflow of Greek workers, the majority of whom emigrate from this area. Relief for farmers, overhaul of the bureaucracy and other issues were also discussed at length by the candidates from the various parties.

Unlike the 1961 campaign, foreign policy issues took a back seat to Greece's domestic problems.

[redacted]

Another foreign policy theme which assumed some importance during the electoral campaign was the Cyprus problem (see page 9 for discussion of these points).

As election day approached a strong feeling prevailed that Papandreou's campaign had appealed to Northern Greek voters while Caramanlis' had never really gotten off the ground. Even ERE supporters, some of them high in the party organization here, were saying privately that their party was in trouble and would be unable to capture the 54 seats it held in the last Parliament.

The November 3 elections have been called the most honest in Greek history. In any event it appears that they were carried out in a scrupulously honest manner in most places. Lawyers who supervised the elections in villages have reported to the Consulate General that the elections were conducted with great care, and that preparation for the balloting often included a speech by the person in charge that no pressure of any kind would be tolerated and that the voting would be completely secret.

The number of abstentions was about the same as in previous elections (18.5 percent) despite the absence of many voters who are working in Western Europe and thus unable to vote. Another consideration is the system for counting the votes for the Army, most of which is located in Northern Greece. Unlike the 1961 elections, the soldier's vote was counted in his home district and, as a consequence, Northern Greece lost many thousands of the soldiers' votes which it previously had.

National Radical Union

Although Caramanlis' party obtained the greatest number of votes in Northern Greece, its margin of victory declined sharply over its 1961 margin, by 16.5 percent, from 57.5 percent to 40.97 percent of the total vote. This party, which in 1961 obtained 50 percent or more of the vote in 14 of 16 electoral districts in this area, received 50 percent or more in only three districts this time. As a result ERE lost 15 of its 54 seats in the Parliament. However, since it obtained 24,184 more votes than the CU, it will have five seats more than the latter party from this area. ERE's loss was fairly evenly distributed throughout the area: its greatest losses occurred in Pella (27 percent), Pieria (25.5), Kilkis (22) and Florina (21), while its smallest losses occurred in and near Thessaloniki where it had made its poorest showing in 1961: Thessaloniki (10 percent), Halkidiki (12), Emathia (12.5) and Thessaloniki B (14). The City of Thessaloniki registered the smallest decline for the ERE, and gave that party 711 more votes than the CU received. As a result ERE picked up a fourth seat here while CU and EDA won only three apiece.

Concerning the fortunes of individual ERE deputies, Caramanlis automatically won his seat in Serres Nome by virtue of his being the head of a party. However, he was forced to face the fact of a sharp decline in the ERE vote in his home district, from 63 percent in 1961 to 46 percent this time. Despite this, Caramanlis' younger brother, Achilleos, won handily and ran far ahead of all other candidates despite the fact it was his first candidacy. Caramanlis' friend and confidant, Dimitrios MAKRIS, won easily although the ERE vote in Florina dropped sharply. The only other Ministers

from Caramanlis' last Cabinet from Northern Greece were Dionysios MANENTIS, Minister for Northern Greece, and Alexandros THEODOSIADES, Deputy Minister for Public Works. Both men led the rest of the ERE pack in their respective districts, Kozani and Thessaloniki, by quite a margin, although the former got 2,000 fewer votes than CU Deputy Mike PAPACONSTANTINOU, and the latter 3,000 less than Labor Minister BAKATSELOS. Some other notables who won on the ERE ticket are Panayiotis YIOKAS (Kastoria) one time Greek representative to Parliamentarian meetings at Strasbourg, Nicolaos MARTIS (Kavalla), former Minister of Commerce and Minister of Industry, Vasilios VASILIKOS (Halkidiki), former Vice Speaker of the Parliament, George THEMELIS, former Deputy Minister of National Defense and Kilkis' Costas PAPADOPOULOS, a right-wing firebrand who sometimes ends up on the floor of the Parliament wrestling with an EDA deputy. Some of the ERE losers are August THEOLOGITES, former Minister for Northern Greece, George PAPAGEORGHIOU, former Secretary General for Northern Greece, and Thessaloniki deputies Nicolaos ZARDINIDES and Apostolos AIDONAS.

Center Union

The principal beneficiary from the shift in voting away from the ERE was the Center Union. Receiving only 29 percent of the vote in 1961, its strength climbed to 39.06 percent at the November 3 elections. The remainder of the lost ERE vote was absorbed by the EDA (2 percent) and the Progressives (5 percent). The Center Union's greatest gains occurred in Pella (23 percent), Xanthi (17.5) and Florina (16), and it did least well in Rodhopi (minus 1.0 percent) and Evros (plus 3.5 percent). In Thessaloniki it increased its vote by eight percent. In popular vote the CU came within 24,184 votes of matching the ERE and will thus have only five seats less than the 39 won by the ERE in Thrace and Macedonia. This number of seats, 34, represents more than twice as many as it held in the last Parliament (17) from this area.

Of the 34 Center deputies elected from Northern Greece, some 25 have served previously in the Parliament. The following well-known persons were victors on the CU slate: George BAKATSELOS, present Minister of Labor, Alexandros BALTATSIS, present Minister of Agriculture, Christos VASMATZIDES, recently appointed head of the Agricultural Bank, Leontis HADJIAPOSTOLOU (Thessaloniki), prominent lawyer, Antonios KASTRINOS (Drama), writer on economic subjects, Stavros NICOLAIDES (Kavalla), literary scholar. One well-known CU politician who failed to win a seat was the Socialist Alexandros KALLIDOPOULOS (Thessaloniki).

[redacted] Actually, Northern Greece's 34 CU deputies should entitle the area, on a strictly mathematical basis, to five ministerial posts instead of the mere two it did in fact receive. Even the post of Minister for Northern Greece went to an outsider, Nicolaos EXARHOS, a long time friend of Papandreou from Trikala. There is some reason, however, to be more optimistic about the future. There are some

capable, young CU deputies rising within the party. One, for example, is Mike PAPACONSTANTINOU (born 1919) from Kozani, who is rumored to be in line for a deputy minister post in the near future. Another is Demosthenses PAPADOPOULOS (born 1929) from Kilkis, who is director of agricultural cooperatives for Northern Greece. A third promising young deputy is Asterios Stellios HASAPIDES (born 1917), a Socialist from Pieria (see A-105, May 8, 1963), who has already established himself as an up and coming labor leader in this area. Other young Center Union deputies, some of whom are reputed to be capable, are Laskaris LASKARIDES (born 1922) and Stefanos TSAPARAS from Thessaloniki B (1916), Ionnis YIAMAS (1916) and Filoktimon PAPADOPOULOS (1918) from Emathia, Emmanuel ZAPARTAS (1927) from Evros, Theodoros LYMBERIDES (1914) from Kavalla, George LAZARIDES (1923) from Kozani, Constantinos SIGANIDES (1918) from Pella, Vasilios INTZES (1920) from Serres and Selahedin GALIP (1928) from Rodhopi.

Union of Democratic Left

EDA increased its percentage of votes in Northern Greece by two percent, from 12.5 to 14.35 percent. It made its best gains in the rural areas of Northern Greece. In Kilkis it increased its vote by 5.2 percent, Thessaloniki B (3.7 percent), Halkidiki (3.5 percent), Kozani and Serres (3 percent). It did less well by a slight margin in Rodhopi and Kastoria than it did in 1961, and also made a poor showing in Drama and Xanthi. In Kavalla and Pella it increased its vote by only about one percent. In Thessaloniki City its percentage of the vote decreased by 1.2 percent, receiving 2,900 fewer votes than in 1961.

EDA leader Ioannis PASSALIDES from Thessaloniki was automatically elected. Party stalwart Dimitrios KELTEMLIDES, who ran in Thessaloniki B in 1961, was elected from the City this time. Three capable young EDA deputies, Alexis PAPALEXIOU, Vasilios EFREMIDES, and Ioannis GAVRIELIDES, were successful in Thessaloniki, Serres and Kilkis, respectively, Efremides having served as deputy from Thessaloniki in the last Parliament.

[redacted] Deputy George TSAROUHAS, who was badly beaten up during the Lambrakis incident, ran unsuccessfully in Serres Nome.

There is considerable talk here that EDA voters, on party instructions, threw their votes to the Center Union to keep Caramanlis from returning to power. However, such allegations do not jibe with the elections results. EDA received 18,900 more votes in Thrace and Macedonia than it did in 1961. This increase occurred despite a smaller total vote (13,700 less) in the area. Further, in conservative rural areas, where EDA had no chance of winning a seat, the EDA vote was substantial and usually greater than in 1961.

For example, the EDA vote increased in the following rural nomes despite a decrease in total vote in most of these nomes:

	1961	1963
Florina	1,894	2,266
Pella	6,642	7,580
Halkidiki	3,098	5,040
Xanthi	2,614	2,833
Rodhopi	2,591	2,590
Kieria	5,502	6,793
Emathia	9,103	10,013
Kozani	8,844	12,302
Kilkis	9,032	11,461
Serres	14,947	19,268
Kavalla	16,237	16,246
Evros	6,701	8,537



Progressive Party

The poor Progressives did lamentably at the polls in Northern Greece. However, they did relatively better here, obtaining five percent of the vote as compared to 3.7 percent nationally. Even the party's leader in this area, Alexandros KARATHODOROS, received only 2,097 votes and failed by a wide margin to regain his seat. One of the two deputies this party succeeded in electing is a Moslem from Thrace, Hassan HATIP OGLU. In Hatip Oglu's nome, Rodhopi, the Progressives received an impressive 18.2 percent of the vote. The next best showing for Markezenis' party was in Drama (8.7 percent), Evros (8.3) and Emathia (8.2). It is interesting to note that in the two nomes where the Center Union made its poorest showing — Rodhopi, one percent decrease and Evros, 1.5 percent increase over 1961 — the Progressives made their best showing. Also in Drama, where the Progressives did well, the Center Union gained less than it did on the average for Northern Greece. These are concrete cases where a good Progressive showing has taken seats from the Center rather than the ERE and runs counter to the argument, that has been heard, that the Progressives hurt the ERE more than they did the Center Union.

Why it Happened

There appear to be a number of specific reasons why the vote went so heavily against the ERE in Thrace and Macedonia. However, if only one word

were used to explain the reason for the surprise Center Union showing, it would be "Papandreou." By capitalizing on a number of serious mistakes by Caramanlis, and by arousing the public on the basic issues of democracy and government, Papandreou became the hero of the hour and carried the day.

The background for Papandreou's surprising electoral success is the gradual change in climate which became perceptible in Northern Greece near the end of 1962. At that time, and increasingly so as time wore on, Papandreou's unrelenting campaign began to strike home and, as it did, Caramanlis became more and more irascible and dogmatic in his actions. Instead of developing a more flexible, enlightened approach in his policies, he fought back savagely and showed himself to be out of tune with the mood of the country. The new mood, which had its genesis in the economic and other successes of the past 11 years, appeared to be a desire for some kind of relaxation, for a softer approach in all spheres. The gap which developed between Caramanlis and the electorate was dramatized for many last May when the Lambrakis incident occurred.

Some time before the elections, many in Northern Greece sensed that there was a gap between their own aspirations and the leadership provided by Caramanlis. The time for a change had therefore arrived. Papandreou, who was in large part responsible for creating and defining this gap, also provided the electorate with a reasonably palatable alternative. Not only did his slogans and arguments appeal to the voters, but more importantly in Greece, his personality captured the imagination a Caramanlis had in earlier campaigns. His success in toppling the PIPINELIS Government made him the hero (leventis) in the eyes of many. In addition to his telling attacks on the ERE government and the tide which developed in his favor, Papandreou offered a pie in the sky program for practically everybody.

The new climate thus generated by Papandreou's efforts and Caramanlis' mistakes and length of time in office succeeded in turning many against the ERE leader on issues where his wisdom and policies had never been questioned before (see discussions below on Cyprus, emigration, relations with the U.S.). Arguments once used to defend Caramanlis were now being turned against him. Given below are some specific developments or attitudes in the economic, political or other areas which offered the voter a concrete reason as well to vote against Caramanlis.

Psychological Factors

In addition to the time for a change mood and the new attitudes towards the government already mentioned, the "make the vote count" psychology of the Northern Greek voter was also a factor in the recent elections. Rather than throw his vote away by voting for a small opposition party of his choice, he voted instead for a party which might be capable of giving strong opposition to the ERE or even gain enough seats to form a government.

[redacted]

Pre-Campaign Incidents

An important pre-campaign incident which accelerated the drift away from Caramanlis in Northern Greece was the Lambrakis episode of last May. More important than the incident itself in influencing the elections, however, was its aftermath which brought about alleged ERE attempts to smear the judges investigating the crime. The implications of the arrest and jailing of four top police officials connected with the affair also had a profound effect. Before the elections even many ERE supporters were convinced that the government had played a major role in the unsavory happenings of May 22. Another important pre-campaign incident, particularly in winning votes from EDA, was Papandreou's success in bringing about the fall of the Pipinelis Government in order to obtain election conditions on his own terms. Finally, Caramanlis' moral victory over the Queen regarding the advisability of visiting England, appeared to have had less impact than the rumors that the Palace had become strongly anti-Caramanlis.

The Campaign

Papandreou's opening campaign speech in Thessaloniki on October 13 provided an indication how the voters were reacting to the man and the campaign issues. The large crowd he drew reacted enthusiastically to his words about governmental dishonesty, democracy, educational reform and promises of tax relief and wage increases. One week earlier, Caramanlis drew a crowd one third smaller in size and considerably less enthusiastic. Caramanlis annoyed many here when he spoke darkly of revising the Constitution and that after the elections he would "take care" of Papandreou.

[redacted]

Mechanical Factors

[redacted]

[redacted]

In the five districts which lost one seat apiece, ERE lost a total of seven seats as compared to 1961 and lost three in the four nomes which added one seat apiece. Another factor is the military vote discussed earlier.

[redacted]

The Royal and American Factors

Many Northern Greeks believe that the Palace, after the London incidents in May and July, has been trying to undermine Caramanlis. This fact in itself helped to put Caramanlis in a new light, that is, as a leader who lacked the support of his former principal champion. This was perhaps sufficient reason for some to withhold their vote from a man they had earlier backed.

In like manner the belief by many that the American Government also had dropped Caramanlis appeared to have some effect on the outcome of the elections. While opinions and interpolations differed, there was talk that Caramanlis' relations with the "American factor" had gone sour. This belief on the part of many voters may also have had some effect on the final outcome. One argument ran to the effect that the leaked aid memorandum was clear proof that Caramanlis had been dropped by the U.S. Government, while another asserted that Caramanlis was too much under the control of the Americans and therefore ineffective in dealing with them. According to Vasilios LAOURDAS, Director of the Institute for Macedonian Studies, the $16 million aid agreement signed a few days before the election was interpreted by some as a last ditch attempt to save Caramanlis. This is to be questioned, however, for in the two weeks since the elections there has been almost no comment regarding any U.S. Government or Embassy involvement in the elections. In all of the arguments heard, some contradictory, Caramanlis is attacked for his failure to deal successfully with the U.S. Government. This provides another example how the general tide of public opinion, once it turned against him on one issue, turned against him in a number of other ways as well.

Other International Factors

Cyprus was another issue of some importance in the electoral campaign here. An undercurrent of popular feeling, long suppressed, revealed itself on this point. The Center Union has long hammered at the theme that the solution worked out on the Cyprus problem had been to Greece's disadvantage, and the principal architect of this agreement on the Greek side was Caramanlis. In the 1958 and 1961 campaigns Caramanlis was not effectively attacked on this issue, but this election,

with the tide running fast against him, a latent malaise about the Cyprus solution seemed to express itself.

International issues, however, took a back seat to Greece's internal problems. One additional international factor deserves mention, nonetheless. That is the relatively good East-West relations which now prevail in contrast to the tense atmosphere which preceded the 1961 elections. Not only had Bulgaria been making threatening noises at that time, but a few months before the elections KHRUSHCHEV made his famous "bomb the Acropolis" gaffe.

Economic Reasons

Even more risky to evaluate are the economic reasons behind Caramanlis' poor showing at the polls. In the opinion of the reporting officer, economic factors were not controlling in swinging the vote from the ERE. The change in attitude toward Caramanlis was more the result of Papandreou's tremendous effort plus the erosion of Caramanlis' position through time and error rather than any economic reasons. Economic factors were important, however, in reinforcing the tide which was building up against ERE.

a. Attitude Toward Economy. While it has succeeded in making a steady growth in the past eight years, Greece remains a low income country, and the 75 percent of the population not living in the Athens area has an appreciably lower level than the admittedly modest standard of the capital. Thus while the lot of the farmer, worker and teacher has improved, the over-all standard is still low. Few Greeks in the provinces have cars, refrigerators or take real vacations, although many are eager to do so more than ever before. The provincial Greek is hoping for a bigger share of the national income, and seems only dimly aware that he may be jeapordizing the gains already made if political instability results or too much relaxation occurs on the economic front. There is another group, according to Demitrios THEODOROU of the Labor Center, such as many of his workers, who are not even aware of the economic ramifications of a change of government and were therefore largely untouched by the "don't rock the boat" arguments of the ERE.

Economic stability is now assumed by many, and the voter feels he can have a change of government without damaging the progress already achieved. The months which elapsed since Caramanlis left for Switzerland have shown him that the economy can function without Caramanlis, and the voter has shown his confidence in the strength of the economy in several ways. Further, the most ominous signs of panic during the past 13 months did not occur after the fall of the ERE government this summer, but during the Cuban crisis of October 1962 when the lira rose to 309 drachmas and other signs of uneasiness were noted (A-36, November 7, 1962).

b. Complaints of Specific Groups. Several groups, believing they had particular grievances, may have voted heavily against the ERE. One such group is the fruit growers, reportedly as a result of low prices and, in the case of peach farmers, anger at a foul-up over refrigerator cars. Tobacco and wheat farmers were also reportedly unhappy over government-set price levels for their products. Further, many workers and groups within the middle class such as teachers are dissatisfied with their wages or salaries, and in this election expressed their dissatisfaction by voting against the ERE.

c. Emigration. In Athens politicians have been clamoring for some time about the national hemorrhage of emigration. As recently as last June, however, the population living in those areas where emigration was heaviest accepted the need of emigration as a necessary fact of life (A-3, July 11, 1963). A change of attitude, unfavorable to the ERE, seems to have occurred during the electoral period, or perhaps shortly before. Caramanlis is now attacked because people are forced to go abroad in order to make a living. This hurt the ERE badly, for many who emigrated were villagers who voted conservatively. Further, those left behind and separated from a member of the family now criticized the ERE for this disruption of normal family living.

Generally, the economic situation in 1963 was if anything somewhat better than that in 1961 prior to the elections. Economic issues were used this time against Caramanlis because the latter's luster had worn off and because voters were now more impatient and felt free to express their impatience with the slow pace of amelioration of their lot. Without Papandreou's hard hitting campaign and successful appeal to the voter, however, these issues might have remained dormant for a while longer.

Small EDA Vote

EDA failed to make significant gains for the same reason ERE lost so heavily, that is, because Papandreou appealed to a number of voters from the left-wing party. While EDA went along with the Pipinelis Government on electoral procedures, Papandreou refused to compromise until completely honest elections could be assured by a genuine caretaker government. This action reportedly made a strong impression on many EDA voters and influenced them to vote for Papandreou. Another factor in keeping the EDA vote down were the candidacies of several former PAME candidates on the CU ticket, such as HADJIAPOSTOLOU of Thessaloniki, Constantinos KONSTOUTARAS of Kavalla and Evanghelos PETSOS of Pella.

Another consideration is that the EDA vote did increase by two percent in Northern Greece, and that most of this gain occurred in rural areas. The best explanation for this is that police pressure held the EDA vote down significantly in rural areas in 1961, so it was natural to expect some increase with the advent of carefully supervised elections.

As Thrace Goes....

One notion explored during the electoral campaign was that Thrace and Macedonia tend to reflect the voting pattern for the entire nation. Based on the results of the last six elections, including the recent one, there appears to be some basis for holding this view. In the 1956, 1958 and 1961 elections Northern Greece gave the winning ERE Party a greater majority than it received nationally. In 1951 and 1952 Northern Greece also picked the first party correctly, but fell short of that party's national average by 5.2 and 2.7 percent respectively. In 1963, however, it gave the second place ERE the greatest number of votes; nevertheless the CU vote here fell only three percentage points behind that party's national total. If one accepts the fact that the area has a conservative bias of a few percentage points, Northern Greece is a fairly good indicator of the national trend. This bellwether aspect of the area plus the location of the Consulate General here, make the region both a useful and accessible place to spot changes in the political climate.

Outlook

At this point, no one in Northern Greece seems to have a clear idea what the future holds for the region or the country. Many changes are expected, however — transfers of nomarchs, new directors for the port, the radio station and sugar refineries — to mention a few. What effect a change in government will have on two large-scale industrial projects planned for the area, Chrysler's Farmobile plant and the Pappas-ESSO oil refinery, remains to be seen. Some CU politicians from Macedonia feel that Pappas has become too closely identified with Caramanlis and that he may even have been an important campaign contributor to the latter. Hostility towards Pappas plus a feeling in some quarters that the government made a bad deal when it signed the agreement with Pappas-ESSO could cause the project serious trouble.

Generally, the outlook for this area does not appear to be much different from that of the rest of Greece. If the country enters into a period of greater political and economic instability than it has during the past 11 years, the fortunes of Northern Greece will change with those of the rest of Greece. For the moment Papandreou appears to be the man of the hour, and his programs for educational, agricultural and other reforms have generated considerable enthusiasm. The reforms in education in particular have excited the imagination of all, including the uneducated, who want their children to have the advantages they were denied. In Northern Greece the educational reforms have created a New Frontier enthusiasm which should redound to Papandreou's

advantage for some time. Whether this will be sufficient to sustain his popularity when the inevitable frustrations arise remains to be seen. For one thing, it seems doubtful whether he will be able to do much, despite his promises, to check the heavy emigration of workers from Northern Greece. At this time, however, the people of Northern Greece seem prepared to give Papandreou a fair chance to lead them before they decide to turn elsewhere for a leader, and at the elections which everybody is talking about for early 1964, they seem prepared to give him the majority which he failed to receive in this area. As for the fortunes of Northern Greece's number one politician, Costas Caramanlis, it may be one, two, three or more years before the Greek people will be ready to ask a wiser, more statesmanlike Caramanlis to lead them again.

For the Consul General:

Dan A. Zachary

Dan A. Zachary
American Consul